Naqvi v. Turkish Airlines, Inc. (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2015). While checking in for his Turkish Airlines flight from Washington Dulles International Airport to Istanbul, Turkey, the passenger/plaintiff requested an exit row seat. According to the plaintiff, airline personnel denied his request but promised him a “leg space seat.” The plaintiff alleged that, upon boarding the aircraft, he discovered that the exit row seats were occupied by passengers who did not meet the minimum height requirement for such seats and that his assigned seat was not a “leg space seat.” The plaintiff also alleged that the airline violated several safety requirements, including by not illuminating the seat belt signs before landing. The plaintiff asserted that the airline’s conduct caused him to suffer “extreme emotional and physical distress.”
In his pro se complaint, the plaintiff advanced causes of action for breach of contract and for discrimination under what the court described as a “kaleidoscope of federal statutes.” The plaintiff demanded compensatory damages of $250,000 and punitive damages of $150,000. After removing the case to federal court, Turkish Airlines moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the Montreal Convention preempted its claims and that it failed to state an actionable breach of contract or discrimination claim.
The court granted the motion. First, the court ruled that the Montreal Convention governed the plaintiff’s claims because they arose from “international carriage” within the meaning of the Convention. The court then ruled that the Convention preempted the plaintiff’s contract and discrimination causes of action. According to the court, the result of the preemption was that, unless the plaintiff could “shoehorn his allegations into an actionable claim” under Article 17 of the Convention, which governs compensation “for the type of personal injury alleged” in the case, he could not state any claim whatsoever against the airline.
Article 17(1) of the Montreal Convention provides as follows: “The carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of death or bodily injury of a passenger upon condition only that the accident which caused the death or injury took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.” The court ruled that the plaintiff had failed to plead that his injuries had been caused by an “accident,” as is required to state a claim under Article 17. Citing cases, the court ruled that, because “disputes over airline seat assignments are neither unexpected nor unusual,” the dispute alleged by the plaintiff did not qualify as an “accident” within the meaning of Article 17.
The court also ruled that the plaintiff’s Article 17 claim failed, even assuming the occurrence of an “accident,” because the plaintiff had failed to “allege that an actionable ‘bodily injury’ resulted from defendant’s purported transgressions.” The plaintiff had asserted that he had suffered “extreme emotional and physical distress,” but, in accordance with the governing caselaw, the court ruled that physical manifestations of mental injuries did not satisfy the Article 17 “bodily injury” requirement.
Note: The plaintiff has another pro se case against an airline, Naqvi v. Saudi Arabian Airlines, pending in the same court.