Ninth Circuit again rejects passengers’ deep vein thrombosis arguments

Twardowski v. American Airlines, Inc. (9th Cir. (Cal.) July 30, 2008).  The passengers in these consolidated appeals alleged that they had suffered injuries from deep vein thrombosis (“DVT”) they had developed during flights for which they had bought tickets between 2001 and 2004.  They alleged that the airlines were liable for such injuries because the airlines had not warned the passengers of the risk of developing DVT, despite public statements that the International Air Transport Association (“IATA”), airline medical officers, and even the august English House of Lords, had made, before the flights at issue, suggesting that the airlines issue such warnings.

Before the trial court, the airlines had successfully moved for summary judgment under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, which applied to the flights at issue and thus provided the passengers’ exclusive remedy against the airlines.  Article 17 of the Convention governs an airline’s liability for a passenger’s death or bodily injury; it provides as follows:  “The carrier is liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.”  The U.S. Supreme Court has defined an “accident” under Article 17 as “an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to the passenger,” not “the passenger’s own internal reaction to the usual, normal, and expected operation of the aircraft.”

In separate prior decisions, the Ninth Circuit had held that developing DVT during a flight is not an “accident” within the meaning of Article 17, and that an airline’s failure to warn about the risk of DVT is not an “event” within the meaning of the foregoing Supreme Court definition of an “accident.”  In Twardowski, the passengers – reaching for what was almost certainly the last arrow in the DVT quiver – argued that the airlines’ failure to comply with the suggestions by IATA and others to warn passengers about DVT was an unexpected “event” and, thus, an “accident” within the meaning of Article 17.

The Ninth Circuit rejected the passengers’ arguments.  It reasoned that an airline’s failure to warn a passenger about DVT does not become an unexpected “event,” and thus an Article 17 “accident,” just because various groups and individuals have publicly suggested that the airline give such warnings.  The court drew a distinction between the general suggestions made to the airlines in this case and the specific requests for health-related assistance made by passengers to airlines in certain other cases in which the courts held that the airlines’ failure to comply with those requests constituted an unexpected “event.”

Court declines to dismiss complaint in passenger heart attack case

Watts v. American Airlines, Inc. (S.D. Ind. Oct. 10, 2007).  During a flight from Japan to Chicago in 2005, the passenger had a heart attack and died in a lavatory.  He was discovered by cleaning personnel after the aircraft had landed.

The plaintiff, the passenger’s wife, filed a lawsuit against American.  The airline moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim under the Montreal Convention, which applied to the transportation at issue and thus provided the plaintiff’s exclusive remedy.

Article 17(1) of the Convention governs an airline’s liability for a passenger’s death or bodily injury; it provides as follows:  “The carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of death or bodily injury of a passenger upon condition only that the accident which caused the death or injury took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.”  The U.S. Supreme Court has defined an “accident” as “an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to the passenger,” not ”the passenger’s own internal reaction to the usual, normal, and expected operation of the aircraft.”  In its motion, American contended that no “accident” had occurred because the passenger’s heart attack was caused by his own internal condition that was not related to the operation of the aircraft.

The court disagreed.  Taking the plaintiff’s allegations as true, the court reasoned that “American Airlines’ unusual or unexpected failure to recognize and/or respond to [the passenger’s] heart attack, and its failure to conform to industry custom and practices by responding to his medical emergency, could constitute a link in the chain of the events causing the ill-fated ‘accident’ on board [the flight].”  Accordingly, the court denied American’s motion to dismiss.

Montreal Convention inapplicable where injured passenger unable to prove that airline regarded multi-airline carriage as “single operation”

Kruger v. United Air Lines, Inc. (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2007).  While waiting on a jetway to board a flight from San Francisco to Seattle, the passenger was inadvertently struck on the head by a backpack swung by another boarding passenger.  The passenger was able to board but became “dazed and nauseated” during the flight due to the incident.

The passenger’s complaint against United alleged that the Montreal Convention governed her claims and also that the airline was liable under various state common law tort causes of action, including negligence, negligent training and supervision of employees and negligent infliction of emotional distress.

United moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the passenger’s state common law claims were preempted by the Montreal Convention.  In its motion, United expressed doubt that the Montreal Convention governed the case, as the incident appeared to have occurred in connection with a domestic flight, but United correctly stated that the court had to accept the passenger’s allegation that the Convention governed as true for purposes of the motion.  As previously reported, the court held that the Convention preempted the passenger’s state common law tort causes of action but that she had stated sufficient facts to plead a cause of action under Article 17 of the Convention by alleging “bodily injury” (the in-flight nausea) that had been caused by an “accident” (the backpack incident) during the course of embarking.

United then moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Montreal Convention did not apply because the jetway incident had occurred in connection with a domestic flight, not an international flight.  Prior to the flight at issue, the passenger had traveled on a United flight from Los Angeles to San Francisco and, before that, on a Qantas flight from Australia to Los Angeles.  Since more than one airline was involved in the transportation, for the flight at issue to constitute “international carriage” governed by the Montreal Convention, it had to be part of “one undivided carriage” under Article 1(3).  Under Article 1(3), a series of flights is considered “one undivided carriage” only “if it has been regarded by the parties as a single operation.”

The court held that the passenger had failed to produce sufficient objective evidence that United had regarded her flights “as a single operation.”  In support of its conclusion, the court noted that the United and Qantas tickets “were not issued by the same travel agent or made as part of a package,” that “they were reserved and paid for separately,” that “the two airlines did not have code sharing agreements and were not partners in the same worldwide alliance,” that “there were no communications between the airlines to coordinate the flights,” and that “the facts of one airline’s itinerary or ticketing was not reflected on the other airline’s itinerary or ticket.”  Accordingly, the court granted United’s motion for summary judgment.

Note:  The court’s summary judgment ruling did not end the case.  The court allowed the passenger to refile her state common law tort causes of actions against United – the very ones that the court had earlier held were preempted by the Montreal Convention – and she did so.

Passenger’s seating decision dooms her personal injury lawsuit

Zarlin v. Air France (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2007).  A flight attendant reseated the passenger during an international flight after she complained that the passenger in front of her had deliberately reclined his seat so that it touched her.  Without informing a flight attendant, the passenger returned to her original seat because the alternative seat was too close to a lavatory.  The passenger in front then reclined his seat again, this time “striking and injuring” the plaintiff’s knee.

The passenger sued the airline, seeking damages for “her medical costs, the value lost in a country club membership, and expenses incurred for pool membership and to resurface her tennis court.”  Air France moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the passenger’s injury was not the result of an “accident” with the meaning of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, arguing that (i) the reclining of the seat was not an “unusual or unexpected” event and thus not an “accident,” and (ii) the passenger’s decision to return to her original seat was the proximate cause of her injury.

The court granted the airline’s motion.  Although the court expressed “serious doubts” that the reclining of the seat was an “accident,” the court ruled that the existence of disputed facts made the granting of summary judgment on this issue improper.  The passenger was not so lucky with the airline’s proximate cause argument.  The court held that the passenger’s decision to return to her seat was the proximate cause of her injury, reasoning that if she had “remained in the new seat she was offered by Defendant’s flight crew, the incident in question could not have taken place.”  The court concluded that because no reasonable jury could find that the airline’s conduct was the proximate cause of the passenger’s injury, the passenger had failed to establish that an “accident” within the meaning of Article 17 had taken place.  Since the Warsaw Convention provided the passenger’s only possible remedy, her claim failed.

Court analyzes “accident” location in ruling on passenger remand motion

Bunis v. Israir GSA, Inc. and Israir Airlines & Tourism, Ltd. (E.D.N.Y. July 30, 2007).  The passenger arrived at JFK on an international flight and deplaned.  At the arrival gate, the passenger asked an airline employee for a wheelchair.  After waiting 20 minutes, the passenger started walking toward the baggage claim area.  In the international arrivals area, but beyond the arrival gate, the passenger began to have chest pains.  The passenger made it to the baggage claim area, where he asked for medical assistance.  He was taken to a hospital by ambulance.

The passenger filed a state court lawsuit against the airline alleging negligence causes of action.  The airline removed the case to federal court on the grounds that the court had original jurisdiction under the Warsaw Convention.  The passenger moved to remand the case to state court, arguing that the Convention did not apply because he had not been in the process of “disembarking” when he sustained his injuries.  Article 17 of the Convention provides that “[t]he carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.”  If the passenger had been in the process of “disembarking” when the “accident” occurred, Article 17 would apply and the court would have jurisdiction under the Convention.

In analyzing this issue, the court rejected both parties’ contention that the “accident” had occurred in the baggage claim area, i.e., where the passenger had asked for medical assistance.  The court ruled that the accident in this case was the airline’s failure to provide the requested wheelchair, and that this failure had occurred while the passenger was at the arrival gate.  Given the proximity of the arrival gate to the aircraft, the court held that the accident had occurred while the passenger was in the course of disembarking.  Accordingly, the court denied the passenger’s remand motion.

Injured passenger prevails on issue of whether “accident” occurred

Wipranik v. Air Canada (C.D. Cal. May 15, 2007).  During a flight from Canada to Israel in 2004, the passenger asked a flight attendant for a cup of hot tea.  After the passenger had placed the cup on her tray table, the seat in front of her moved, causing the cup to slide off the tray table and onto her lap.  The passenger claimed that she suffered injuries as a result of this incident.

Air Canada moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the cause of the passenger’s injuries was not an “accident” under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention.  That article provides that “[t]he carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.”  Where the Warsaw Convention (or the Montreal Convention, its successor) applies, it provides the only remedy for the passenger.  Thus, if there has been no “accident,” even a seriously injured passenger has no remedy against an airline.

The U.S. Supreme Court has defined an “accident” under the Warsaw Convention as “an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to the passenger.”  Applying this definition, the court held that the incident was an accident; it reasoned as follows:  “The slide of the tea off of the tray table and its fall onto Plaintiff’s lap were events ‘external’ to Plaintiff.  Moreover, those events were unusual and unexpected.  Although it may be common for an airline seat to shake when its occupant moves around, it is not common for beverages placed on the tray table behind that seat to be so jolted by the movement that they fall onto another passenger.  It is the failure of the tray table to hold beverages securely despite passenger movement in the seat in front that is unexpected.”  Accordingly, the court denied the airline’s motion.

The court granted the plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment that the airline was liable for her injuries.  However, the court also held that the airline had the opportunity, pursuant to Article 21 of the Warsaw Convention, to prove at trial that the passenger’s damages should be reduced by her contributory negligence.  Article 21 provides that “[i]f the carrier proves that the damage was caused by or contributed to by the negligence of the injured person the court may, in accordance with the provisions of its own law, exonerate the carrier wholly or partly from his liability.”

Court grants summary judgment against “undeserving litigant” in personal injury lawsuit

Agravante v. Japan Airlines International Co., Ltd. (D. Guam July 9, 2007).  The passenger claimed in his lawsuit against JAL that he suffered back injuries as a result of a “standing takeoff” in 2002.  In a standing takeoff, the flight crew taxis the aircraft to the runway, sets the brakes, sets the engines to a predetermined power setting and then releases the brakes.  The aircraft’s computer controls the takeoff roll and acceleration.  A standing takeoff imparts more force on passengers than a manually-controlled takeoff does but is considered routine in the aviation industry.

The airline moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the passenger’s supposed injuries were not caused by an “accident” within the meaning of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention and that even if an accident did occur, there is no causal link between such accident and the passenger’s injuries.  Article 17 provides that “[t]he carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.”

The court granted the airline’s motion.  The court generously gave the passenger the benefit of the doubt that the standing takeoff was an “accident” within the meaning of Article 17 but held that the passenger’s allegation that the takeoff was the proximate cause of his injuries “cannot withstand even cursory scrutiny.”  The court noted that the passenger’s “own medical evidence” showed that his back problems were the result of a degenerative disease, not the takeoff, that the passenger had not mentioned any injuries in the incident report he submitted to the airline immediately after the flight and that he did not seek medical treatment until two years after the flight.

In closing its opinion, the court stated:  “The Warsaw Convention imposes a form of absolute liability on international air carriers for accidents which cause passenger injuries.  Since liability under the Convention is nearly absolute, courts should be wary of reckless invocation of the Convention by eager but undeserving litigants.  Here is such an instance of an undeserving litigant.”

Airline not liable for failure to warn in DVT case

James v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (9th Cir. (Cal.) Jan. 22, 2007).  The Ninth Circuit held that the airline’s failure to warn the passenger of the risk of developing deep vein thrombosis was not an “accident” under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention.  As a result, the court affirmed the district court’s summary judgment for the airline on the passenger’s failure to warn claim.

If a passenger’s travel was subject to the Warsaw or Montreal Convention but the passenger cannot proceed under the applicable Convention because he did not suffer an “accident” resulting in “bodily injury,” the passenger cannot proceed at all against the airline.

Airlines not liable for passengers’ DVT

Cortez v. Air New Zealand Ltd. (9th Cir. (Cal.) Oct. 2, 2006) & Damon v. Air Pacific Ltd. (9th Cir. (Cal.) Oct. 2, 2006).  In virtually identical opinions, the Ninth Circuit held that neither the passengers’ development of deep vein thrombosis (“DVT”) nor the airlines’ failure to warn the passengers of the risk of DVT constitutes an “accident” as that term is used in Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention.  Since no “accident” had occurred, the airlines were not liable for the passengers’ DVT injuries.

Airline not liable for downgrading passenger tickets

Sobol v. Continental Airlines (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2006).  Due to overbookings, the airline downgraded some of the first class tickets held by family members to coach class, causing the family to be separated during the international flights at issue.

The family members alleged in their lawsuit that the separation caused them emotional trauma and stress, but no physical injury.  They alleged causes of action for emotional distress, breach of contract, conversion, unjust enrichment and punitive damages, and sought damages totaling over $3 million.

Even though the events at issue took place in 2005, and thus were governed by the Montreal Convention, the court primarily analyzed the issues under the Warsaw Convention.  The court rejected the passengers’ emotional distress claim because the separation of the family did not constitute an “accident” resulting in “bodily injury,” as is required to state a claim under the Warsaw Convention.  The court rejected the passengers’ remaining claims on the grounds that because the Warsaw and Montreal Conventions do not contain a provision dealing directly with the downgrading of a ticket, those claims are preempted.  If a passenger whose travel is subject to the Conventions cannot proceed under the Conventions, he cannot proceed at all.